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Lobbying of Firms by Voters
Matthias Dahm∗ Robert Dur† Amihai Glazer‡
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Abstract
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy
it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district
whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium,
no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support
though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program.
When votes reveal information about the district, the firm’s implicit
promise or threat can be credible.
1 Introduction
We commonly suppose that a special interest incurs a cost in influencing
policy: a firm may have to pay a bribe, hire persuasive lobbyists, and so on.
In short, the special interest must pay for a favor it seeks from the voters or
politicians who hold power.
But the opposite view, pursued here, can also be fruitful: the voters or
politicians seek a favor from the special interest, and pay for it by supporting
a policy the special interest favors. An attraction of this view is its expla-
nation for the “Tullock paradox,” the observation that the level of political
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contributions is surprisingly small compared to the benefits special interests
can receive (Tullock 1972; see also Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder
2003).
In the United States total corporate lobby expenditures and campaign
contributions are surprisingly small. Thus, in his work on the effects of
campaign contributions on roll-call voting, Chappell (1982) identifies legis-
lation considered important to special interest groups. In the election year
preceding the House vote to stop funding of five B-1 bombers, Rockwell
International gave a minuscule $7,800 to 35 congressmen. Common Cause
(1979) estimates that in the 1979-1980 election cycle corporate PACs con-
tributed only $19.2 million to congressional candidates (Kosterlitz 1982). In
the first quarter of 1984, registered lobbyists spent only $11.75 million on
such items as office rent, salaries and newsletters. A congressman sitting on
the House Armed Services Committee or on the Defense subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee could expect to receive only about one
thousand dollars in annual contributions from the largest defense firms: not
from each contractor, but from the twenty largest contributors combined.
The recipient of the largest contributions received only $23,450 from these
firms (Weinberger and Greevy 1982).
Nor is the size of illegal contributions large. Investigations following the
Watergate scandal found that twenty-one companies made illegal contribu-
tions in 1972, totaling only $968,000; the largest one was made by Northrop
for a mere $150,000 (Alexander 1980). These sums are small compared to
the value of government contracts, suggesting that our understanding of rent
seeking is incomplete.1
The behavior we consider was well captured by Lawrence O’Brien, who
had served as Special Assistant to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
B. Johnson, as Postmaster General of the United States, and as National
Chairman of the Democratic Party. In an oral interview2 he said
The NFL [National Football League] enjoyed an excellent rela-
tionship with the Congress. Some of it was, however, on the
basis of NFL expansion–where the NFL might locate in the fu-
ture and the constant quest on the part of some members for a
1Additional U.S. data indicating that contributions are small compared to the value of
public policies at stake is reported by Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003).
2Transcript, Lawrence F. O’Brien Oral History Interview XVII, 12/17/86, by Michael
L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library.
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franchise location in their state... Over the course of time, expan-
sion was effectively played off against legislation, to the benefit
of the NFL...This was an internal matter in the Congress. The
league operated directly with the Congress. They could pick their
spots and they effectively utilized this leverage that they had...
[They held off] decisions on franchises, because if you had a half
a dozen to a dozen possible sites and that involved ten or twelve
states, you were in a pretty good position.
The analysis below formalizes this idea, supposing that a legislator who
votes for a policy a firm wants may thereby attract a firm’s investment to
his district. If no legislator is decisive, then a single legislator’s vote does not
determine policy, so that a legislator may vote for the policy the firm favors
even if the policy adopted hurts all districts.
Though we will speak of a firm’s investment, the basic mechanism we
study also applies to different situations. For example, a congressman aiming
to run for higher office may want to establish a particular voting record. A
reinterpretation of our model suggests that congressmen may then vote for
a policy which they prefer be rejected, and that all the congressmen would
be better off if they jointly agreed to oppose the policy.
2 Literature
This paper addresses several issues studied in other models of political in-
fluence. Some models suppose that special interests buy influence. Other
models suppose special interests provide information to policymakers. Our
model relates to both.3
2.1 Influence buying
A classic analysis of how special interests may influence public policy is Tul-
lock (1980), who considers rent-seeking contests. In these contests policy
makers are modeled through a contest success function which translates a
3Other models that combine both strands of literature are Bennedsen and Feldmann
(2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (2008a and 2008b). In these models special interests choose
between providing policy-relevant information or engaging in non-informational influence
activities (such as by making campaign contributions).
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special interest’s spending on influencing policy to the probability that gov-
ernment adopts the policy it favors. This approach, as usually postulated,
suffers from a commitment problem: once rent-seeking efforts are exerted,
the utility-maximizing choice for a policy maker need not be to choose a
policy with the probability specified by the contest success function.4
A different model considers menu auctions (see Grossman and Helpman
1994). The model is usually applied to determine the value of a continuous
policy variable government will set in response to payment from firms in af-
fected industries. Each firm is assumed to make an (implicit) offer relating
prospective contributions to the policies chosen by the government. The gov-
ernment then sets a policy vector (Grossman and Helpman (1994) consider
a set of import and export taxes).
This approach suffers from two weaknesses, that our approach overcomes.
First, a menu auction effectively considers bribery, which in most democra-
cies is illegal, and is often unpopular with voters. Second, it assumes that
each special interest can commit to a payment. But, of course, after the
government sets policy, each special interest would gain by reneging on the
promised payment. Nor does punishment by a policymaker appear to work:
McCarty and Rothenberg (1996) find that incumbents do not punish lobbying
groups who had not supported them (or who had supported their opponents)
in a prior election.
In a menu auction, special interests commit to contingent payments, and
in equilibrium pay the policy maker. Dal Bo´ (2007) offers a different strategy
for the special interest, showing that the equilibrium can have the special
interest influence policy while paying almost nothing. His insight (which we
adapt) is that if a strong majority of legislators can be induced to vote for
the special interest’s policy, then no legislator is decisive, and therefore each
is indifferent between voting for and against the policy. The special interest
can induce legislators to support it by committing to pay a legislator if and
only if he casts a decisive vote in its favor. This approach, unlike the menu
auction model and the rent-seeking model, requires the special interest to
make only a very small payment in equilibrium. Like previous approaches,
however, it suffers from the problem that special interests must commit to
contingent payments.
4Analyzing a game with two rent-seekers, Corcho´n and Dahm (2009) show that some
contest success functions can be derived as utility-maximizing choice from a setting in
which rent-seekers are uncertain about the type of politician. See also the literature
reviewed therein.
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2.2 Information provision
Our discussion of lobbying relates to literature which considers information
lobbyists may provide policy makers. The information can concern the im-
portance of the problem a legislator is considering (Hansen 1991, Smith 1995),
the effectiveness of policy (Krehbiel 1991, Smith 1995), and the electoral
consequences of different policies (Kingdon 1984 and Hansen 1991). Hansen
(1991) supposes that a reelection-minded legislator is unsure about the pol-
icy positions that would best help reelection. He therefore listens to interest
groups which have private information about constituency opinion, with the
interest groups in turn persuading a legislator that his political self-interest
lies in taking group-friendly positions. Hansen (1991) also offers evidence
that organizations are granted access by congressmen when the organizations
know more than other potential informants about constituent preferences, is-
sues, and other representatives.
Smith (1984) considers legislators who rely on informants that quickly
provide interpretations on the political consequences of different actions. Hall
(2000) argues that legislators grant access to organized interests because of
the informational subsidies groups provide: lobbyists selectively subsidize
the information and legislative labor costs of members who already agree
with them. Lobbyists can thus make it easier for a legislator to expend
greater effort advancing a policy objective she has in common with the group.
Legislators in turn act as if they were working on behalf of the group, when
instead they work only on behalf of themselves. Several other papers model
legislators who seek reelection and who aim to take positions popular in their
districts, and groups having private information about district opinion which
they strategically transmit to influence the legislator (see Austen-Smith 1993,
Austen-Smith and Wright 1992 and 1994, Rasmussen 1993, and Lohmann
1995 and 1998). The information that legislators seek can also relate to the
effects of policy (Lohmann 1995, and Wright 1996).
Our model differs from this strand of the literature because we look at
the opposite path, how votes inform special interests. Empirical support for
our assumption that policy can signal a jurisdiction’s type appears in Raff
and Srinivasan (1998). They suppose that a firm which is initially uncertain
about business conditions in a host country may infer that a government
which offers tax incentives is signaling favorable business conditions. The
data they report are consistent with a signaling model which predicts that tax
incentives correlate positively with country risk and the degree of openness.
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In our model the special interest could also become informed by asking
each district whether it favors the firm’s investment. The answer is cheap talk
(see Crawford and Sobel 1982), with information credibly revealed because
no district has an incentive to lie. It is in the firm’s interest, however, to
invest preferentially in districts that support the policy the firm favors, as
this allows the policy to be approved.
2.3 Local benefits
Our consideration of benefits to a district or group relates to work by Schwartz
(1987) and by Uhlaner (1989). Uhlaner (1989) supposes that a leader of a
group can induce turnout by granting members of his group private benefits.5
Schwartz (1987) discusses a “local public benefit” to a group which increases
with the number of votes the winner received from that group.
How legislators can obtain local benefits is discussed by Bernheim, Rangel,
and Rayo (2006), who analyze legislative policy making when the default pol-
icy changes from period to period, and the agenda setter in each period offers
a policy that depends on past policies. The authors show that a majority
might support a pork-barrel policy that hurts almost every legislator. This
result resembles ours in the sense that (almost) all legislators would be better
off if there were no vote. However, the institution Bernheim, Rangel, and
Rayo (2006) examine differs from ours, and so has different voting incentives.
In particular, in our model a legislator who votes for a tariff wins a reward
independently of whether the policy is adopted; that is not true in the pork
barrel setting. Another important difference is that, unlike us, Bernheim,
Rangel, and Rayo (2006) assume that legislators vote sincerely, as if each
was always pivotal. We allow a legislator to recognize that his vote may not
be decisive.
3 Assumptions
We consider one special interest, or firm. It favors a policy (say a tariff) that
would give it a benefit of B, at a cost of C to each of the n > 2 districts.
To make the problem interesting, suppose the tariff is inefficient: nC > B.
5Lapp (1999), however, testing the model, finds little empirical evidence that ethnic
leaders can increase turnout among their followers.
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Indeed, we can make the stronger assumption that the tariff is bad even when
confined to a mere majority of districts: (n + 1)C/2 > B.6
The firm contemplates an investment, say a new factory. In each district,
voters may view the investment as either good (giving a benefit of g) or as
bad (imposing a cost of b).7 A district may favor the investment because of
job and income creation. A district may oppose the investment because of
environmental concerns. Again, we are interested in situations with C > g:
the benefit to the district from the investment is less than the cost to it of the
tariff. We denote by m the number of districts which favor the investment;
we assume that m at least equals a majority of districts plus one, or m ≥
1 + (n + 1)/2. To simplify the notation we also denote the consequences of
investment for a district as pi ∈ {−b, g}. A district with consequence g favors
the investment; a district with consequence −b opposes it.
The firm prefers to invest in a district which favors the investment rather
than a district which opposes it. The firm, however, is initially unaware of
the views in each district; it only knows the probability γ that any district
favors the investment. Each district, or the voters in it, does know whether
it would gain or lose from the investment.
For several reasons the special interest may prefer to invest in a district
which favors the investment. The firm may want a favorable business climate,
where it will face little litigation, will find it easy to get environmental and
zoning approvals, and so on. Or the firm may prefer to locate in a district
where many workers (and so, by implication many voters) would want to
work at such a firm: it could then offer a lower wage, choose from a larger
pool of workers, enjoy the productivity benefits of high morale, and so on.
Each district votes for or against the tariff, or alternatively votes for one
of two candidates, whose positions on the tariff are known. The tariff is
adopted if a simple majority of districts vote for it.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Each district recognizes whether an investment by the firm would ben-
efit or harm it.
2. A district votes for or against the tariff.
3. If a majority of districts vote for the tariff, it is imposed.
6For brevity, we take n to be an odd number.
7The firm may invest with probability less than 1. The values of g and b can then be
taken as expected values.
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4. The firm chooses where to invest, independent of whether the tariff is
imposed.
5. Payoffs are realized.
4 Benchmark result
As in many other voting games, the game we study has many equilibria.
One equilibrium is particularly compelling. Our approach is therefore to
characterize this equilibrium quickly and to postpone the analysis of further
equilibria.
To do so we simplify the analysis in this section in two ways. First, we
assume that the firm infers that a district voting for the tariff favors the
investment; we check informally when this inference is consistent with the
voting behavior of the districts. This simplification allows us to look at Nash
equilibria rather than at Perfect Bayesian equilibria, and will be relaxed later
(in Subsection 5.3).
Second, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium with pure strategies. By
“symmetry” we mean that each district which favors the investment uses
the same strategy as that of the other districts favoring the investment,
and similarly for every district which opposes the investment.8 The next
section considers extensions to our basic framework including asymmetric
pure-strategy equilibria (in Subsection 5.1) and symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibria (in Subsection 5.2).
Consider a district’s voting decision. Denote by k the number of other
districts that vote for the tariff, and remember that pi ∈ {−b, g} indicates the
district’s payoff from the investment. In two situations the district’s vote is
not pivotal, that is, the collective decision does not depend on the district’s
vote. In neither situation the district’s vote affect whether the cost C of the
tariff is imposed. The voting decision matters, however, because by voting
for the tariff the district may attract the firm’s investment.9 In the first
8Obviously, we do not require that a district which favors the investment uses the same
strategy as that of a district which opposes the investment, with the labels ‘voting for’
and ‘voting against’ swapped.
9Strictly speaking, we assume that a district that does not want the investment cannot
prevent the firm from locating in the district. Incorporating such a veto power, Proposition
1 below still holds, although the strategy of the districts that oppose the investment is
then weakly dominant.
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situation the district in question knows that, excluding itself, a majority of
districts vote against the tariff, that is, k ≤ (n − 3)/2.10 Here a district
strictly prefers voting for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
>
{
0 if k > 0
pi
n
if k = 0
. (1)
If all districts vote against the tariff, the firm learns nothing, and chooses
randomly where to invest.
In the second situation, the district in question knows that, excluding
itself, a majority of districts vote for the tariff, that is, k ≥ (n + 1)/2,
implying that a district strictly prefers to vote for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
− C > −C. (2)
On the other hand, when k = (n − 1)/2 the district’s vote is pivotal and
the district’s vote matters for both the approval of the tariff and the firm’s
decision where to invest. Here a district votes for the tariff if and only if
pi
k + 1
− C > 0, (3)
or, since k = (n−1)/2, 2pi/(n+1)−C > 0. Intuitively, a pivotal district only
votes for the tariff if possible gains from increasing the chance of attracting
the firm’s investment outweigh the cost of the tariff to the district.
Consider a district which views the investment as bad (pi = −b). From
the above equations (1), (2) and (3), we see that voting against the tariff is
a strictly dominant strategy.
Now consider a district that favors the investment (pi = g). By analogous
reasoning, when C/g < 2/(n + 1), voting for the tariff is a strictly dominant
strategy. For higher values of C/g voting for a tariff is not the dominant
strategy.
Consider, however, the following voting profile in which each district
which favors the investment votes for the tariff, and each other district uses
its strictly dominant strategy and votes against the tariff. By our assump-
tion on m, at least (n + 1)/2 other districts vote for the tariff. Therefore no
district’s vote is decisive and the trade-off in equation (2) is relevant. Hence,
a district which favors the investment prefers to vote for the tariff.
10Note that, by definition of n and k, n − k − 1 other districts vote against the tariff,
which constitute a majority if n− k − 1 ≥ (n+ 1)/2, implying k ≤ (n− 3)/2.
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This voting behavior is consistent with the firm’s inference. If a district
which favors the investment votes for the tariff, whereas a district which
opposes the investment votes against the tariff, then the firm will rationally
conclude that it would gain more by investing in a district that supported
the tariff than in a district which opposed it. Thus, indeed, a district which
favors the investment is more likely to attract the investment by voting for
the tariff than by voting against it.
Note also that it is not an equilibrium for all districts to vote against
the tariff: no district would be decisive, and a district which favors the tariff
could then attract the investment by voting for the tariff (see equation (1)
with k = 0).11
We summarize with
Proposition 1 There exists a unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium all districts which favor the investment vote for the
tariff; all other districts vote against the tariff, and the tariff is approved.
If the benefits to the districts which favor the investment is sufficiently high,
that is, if C/g < 2/(n + 1), then this equilibrium is in strictly dominant
strategies.
Measuring social welfare by the sum of the utilities of the districts and
of the firm, we easily see that nothing prevents an inefficient outcome from
arising. In the unique equilibrium, a majority vote for the tariff—the firm
gains B, while the districts collectively lose nC. The inefficiency arises be-
cause for efficiency the benefits and costs of the tariff matter (B and C), but
in equilibrium each district’s vote is based on its individual benefit or cost in
attracting the firm’s investment (pi ∈ {−b, g}). For the same reason, there
might be an inefficient equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies.12
Notice that the preceding supposes that votes on the tariff allow the firm
to benefit from matching the firm’s investment location to a district which
favors the investment. If the benefits from good matches are low as compared
11Besides the two voting profiles described above, two other symmetric strategy profiles
are candidates for an equilibrium. Each, however, requires districts which do not favor
investment to use a strictly dominated strategy.
12To see that a dominant strategy equilibrium and an inefficiency are not mutually
exclusive, consider the example in which g = B = 1. It must hold that B/n < C and
C/g < 2/(n + 1). These expressions define a non-empty interval for C described by
1/n < C < 2/(n+ 1). But, of course, when the inefficiency becomes increasingly severe,
the equilibrium is no longer in dominant strategies.
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to the net costs of the tariff, then the inefficiency is not reversed.13 We state
this result with
Proposition 2 If the welfare costs of the tariff are sufficiently high, that is
if C is high in comparison to B, then the outcome of the collective decision
is inefficient.
5 Extensions
We now discuss several ways of relaxing our assumptions. The first three
subsections deal with the existence, common in voting games, of multiple
equilibria. We analyze the most obvious alternative equilibria and argue
why we find that the one established in Proposition 1 will often best describe
reality.
To examine when inefficient policy may arise and how it can be avoided,
we relax in the remaining subsections several of our assumptions. It turns
out that inefficient policy arises in most of these extensions.
5.1 Asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria
Equilibria with asymmetric pure strategies can appear when C/g ≥ 2/(n +
1). To see this, consider the following strategy profile where k = (n −
1)/2 districts which favor the investment vote for the tariff and all others
vote against. As a result, the tariff is rejected. Here districts opposing the
investment use a strictly dominant strategy. The districts voting for the
tariff are not pivotal and following equation (1) behave optimally. A district
favoring the investment and voting against the tariff is pivotal. As captured
in equation (3), such a district also behaves optimally.
But even allowing for equilibria with asymmetric pure strategies, the
solution in Proposition 1 remains an equilibrium and can explain why a
legislature adopts an inefficient policy though lobbying expenditures are very
low.
13This argument can be made precise. Denote by Bm the firm’s benefits from a successful
matching. In the unique equilibrium, social welfare is B − nC + Bm + g. Suppose the
alternative is that a vote on the tariff is not held, and that the firm decides randomly
where to locate the investment. Then γ(Bm + g) + (1− γ)(−b). If (1− γ)(Bm + g+ b) is
smaller than −(B − nC), the inefficiency is not reversed.
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The relevant question is then which equilibrium is more likely to be
played. In our view this is the symmetric one, because in an asymmetric
equilibrium districts of the same type behave differently. The asymmetry re-
quires explaining why some districts can preempt others and free-ride on the
negative vote of other districts. In other words, asymmetric behavior of dis-
tricts should be based on some underlying asymmetry among districts which
should be modeled explicitly. A natural explanation would be a sequential
voting procedure. We consider this institutional arrangement in Subsection
5.8.
5.2 Symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
Of course, an equilibrium can also have each district which favors the invest-
ment vote for the tariff with positive probability less than one. By voting for
the tariff it would trade off the increased chance of attracting the investment
with the increased probability that the inefficient tariff will be adopted.
Consider a given district which favors the investment. Suppose all other
m−1 districts which favor the investment vote for the tariff with probability
x, and all districts which oppose the investment vote against the tariff. If
the district votes for the tariff, then for all realizations of the other district’s
mixed strategies it has a chance of attracting the investment. Moreover, when
enough districts vote for the tariff, the cost C is incurred. More precisely,
expected payoffs are given by
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k
g
k + 1
−
m−1∑
k= n−1
2
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k C.
On the other hand, a district which votes against the tariff would attract
the firm’s investment only when all other districts vote against. Here also
the cost C must be incurred–but only when there are enough votes for the
tariff excluding the district’s vote. Expected payoffs are thus described by
(1− x)m−1
g
n
−
m−1∑
k= n+1
2
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k C.
A district favoring the investment is indifferent between voting for and
against the tariff if and only if the expected benefits of attracting the firm’s
12
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Figure 1: Mixed-strategy equilibria for n = m ∈ {3, 9, 25}.
investment for all the possible realizations of the other district’s mixed strate-
gies equal the expected benefits of voting against the tariff when the district
is pivotal. Formally, we have that
(1− x)m−1
n− 1
n
g +
m−1∑
k=1
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k
g
k + 1
must equal (
m − 1
n−1
2
)
x
n−1
2 (1− x)m−1−
n−1
2 C.
Since this equation involves binomial coefficients, the general case is diffi-
cult to solve. But by fixing n and m we can solve explicitly for the symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibria. We find that for a mixed-strategy equilibrium to
exist C/g must be sufficiently high. However, there then also exist two
mixed-strategy equilibria.
The equilibria have very different comparative statics. For the first equi-
librium (denoted by x1), an increase in the ratio C/g reduces the probability
a district votes for the tariff; in the second equilibrium (denoted by x2) the
13
opposite holds.14 Figure 1 shows these equilibria for n = m ∈ {3, 9, 25}.
We see that, for these values, as n increases the mixed-strategy equilibria
converge to zero and one, respectively.15 Thus, even under the extension of
mixed-strategy equilibria, with positive probability inefficient legislation is
approved.
5.3 The firm’s beliefs about a district’s type
We so far assumed that the firm infers that a district which votes for the tariff
favors the investment. This assumption simplified the analysis by allowing
us to look at Nash equilibria rather than at Perfect Bayesian equilibria. This
inference, however, is not the only possibility.
In a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium the districts and the firm all behave
optimally, given their beliefs about the others’ actions; these beliefs are, in
equilibrium, correct. Notice first that the equilibrium established in Proposi-
tion 1 is still an equilibrium when we endogenize the firm’s beliefs in this way,
because we already checked informally that the firm’s inference is consistent
with the voting behavior of the districts.
But other equilibria exist. Consider the following candidate equilibrium.
All districts that favor the investment vote against the tariff, while all others
vote for the tariff. The firm infers that a district which votes for the tariff
opposes the investment, so that the firm invests in a district which voted
against the tariff. Clearly, the firm’s inference is consistent with the districts’
voting behavior. Moreover, given this inference and this voting profile, at
14It seems that x1 is a more appealing equilibrium than x2, because it is plausible
that as legislation becomes more inefficient it is less often approved. There are further
reasons to focus on x1. Consider n = 3 and suppose x1 and x2 exist. Denote by A(x)
and B(x) the expected payoffs from voting for and against the tariff, respectively, when
the other two districts vote for the tariff with probability x. We have that A′(x) < 0,
A′′(x) > 0, B′(x) < 0, B′′(x) < 0, and A(0) > B(0) > A(1) > B(1). Hence, A(x) and
B(x) intersect twice (at x1 and at x2), and expected payoffs are strictly higher at x1.
Another reasoning could be based on a simultaneous version of Cournot’s tatonnement
process, adapted to symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. Consider an equilibrium xˆ to
be (locally) stable if given a collective mistake in which everyone mixes with probability
xˆ + m, where m ∈ {−, } with  > 0. Then for all districts A(xˆ + m) > B(xˆ + m) if
m < 0, and A(xˆ + m) < B(xˆ + m) if m > 0 Similarly, consider an equilibrium xˆ to be
(locally) unstable if for some district the opposite inequality holds. Given how A and B
intersect, x1 is stable, whereas x2 is unstable.
15Further simulations for higher n yield chaotic mixing probabilities, which could be
due to rounding of values in the computer program Mathematica.
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least 1 + (n + 1)/2 districts vote against the tariff. Therefore equation (1)
becomes
0 >
pi
h + 1
, (4)
where h is the number of other districts that vote against the tariff. This
inequality implies that all districts behave optimally and that this profile is
indeed an equilibrium. Moreover, this equilibrium is efficient.
We can say that, depending on the beliefs of the firm, in one equilibrium
the legislature approves the tariff, and that in another equilibrium it does not.
So in one sense the beliefs of the firm determine (partially) the equilibrium.
Given that the firm wants the tariff, it has an incentive to manage districts’
beliefs so as to induce the inefficient equilibrium.
Another argument in favor of the equilibrium in Proposition 1 rests on
expressive voting. Suppose that with some probability a district votes not
instrumentally, but to express its feelings. Then a district which opposes
the investment may want to express its disapproval of the firm by voting
against the firm’s interests, that is by voting against the tariff. Similarly,
a district which favors the investment or the industry may be more willing
than a different district to vote for a tariff the firm desires. So an equilibrium
in which districts that favor the investment vote for the tariff appears more
natural, and less subject to deviation, than the equilibrium in which the
opposite pattern appears.
5.4 Uncertainty about other districts’ types
Suppose, in contrast to our previous assumptions, that each district is unsure
about how many other districts favor the investment. Let each district believe
that any other district favors the investment with probability γ. In what
follows we establish values of γ for which it is an equilibrium that all districts
favoring the investment vote for the tariff and all others vote against.
Consider a district which favors the investment. Suppose all other dis-
tricts which favor the investment vote for the tariff, while all other districts
use their strictly dominant strategy and vote against the tariff. A district
which votes for the tariff trades off the increased chance of getting the in-
vestment with the increased probability that the tariff is approved and the
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costs C must be incurred. More precisely, expected payoffs are given by
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)n−1−k
g
k + 1
−
n−1∑
k= n−1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)n−1−k C.
On the other hand, a district which votes against the tariff could attract
the firm’s investment only if all other districts vote against the tariff. In
addition, the cost C is imposed when even without the vote of the district
in question a majority vote for the tariff; that is
(1− γ)n−1
g
n
−
n−1∑
k= n+1
2
(
n− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)n−1−k C.
The district strictly prefers to vote for the tariff if and only if
0 < ∆(γ) :=
(1− γ)n−1
n − 1
n
g +
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)n−1−k
g
k + 1
−
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
γ
n−1
2 (1− γ)
n−1
2 C.
The following Proposition says that in many circumstances the previous in-
equality holds, implying that Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of
‘noise.’
Proposition 3 For any C, g and n, there exists γˆ ∈ [1/2, 1) such that for
all γ ∈ [γˆ, 1], it is an equilibrium for each district that favors the investment
to vote for the tariff, while all other districts vote against.
Proof. Notice that g(n − 1)/n > g/n and g/(k + 1) ≥ g/n, for all
k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Hence,
∆(γ) >
g
n
−
(
n− 1
n−1
2
)
γ
n−1
2 (1− γ)
n−1
2 C := ∆ˆ(γ).
Notice that ∆ˆ(γ) is continuous and differentiable. Moreover, it attains a
unique minimum at γ = 1/2 and we have ∆ˆ(γ = 0) = ∆ˆ(γ = 1) = g/n.
Suppose that ∆ˆ(γ = 1/2) ≥ 0. Then choose γˆ = 1/2. Suppose ∆ˆ(γ = 1/2) <
0. Then there exist two values, γ1 and γ2 with 0 < γ1 < 1/2 < γ2 < 1, such
that ∆ˆ(γ1) = ∆ˆ(γ2) = 0. In this case choose γˆ = γ2. Q.E.D.
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5.5 Tax breaks and other inducements to invest
In the benchmark game, a district can attract the firm’s investment only
by voting for the tariff. But districts compete for investments in additional
ways, for example, by giving tax breaks and other incentives.
We suppose that a congressman’s preferences or constituency may differ
from that of a local official who engages in lobbying—the two types may be
elected at different times, have faced different turnouts, or be elected from
jurisdictions of different sizes. Let the firm prefer to invest in a locale whose
congressman and local lobbyist both favor the investment. Such joint support
may increase the firm’s confidence that voters support the investment, or
may be necessary for the firm to successfully navigate political constraints.
Moreover, if the congressmen knows the attitudes of other officials in the
jurisdiction, he will vote for the tariff only if the local officials will also offer
the firm benefits.
Thus, the firm will not invest in a district which voted against the tariff.
Districts which voted for the tariff compete simultaneously with one another
to attract the firm’s investment. District i offers to pay the firm ei if the firm
locates in the district.
To find a subgame perfect equilibrium we will solve this game by backward
induction. Consider the last stage and notice that a district that opposes
the investment sets ei = 0, as incentives are costly. Denote the number of
districts obtaining access and lobbying (actively) for the investment by l.
Suppose the lobbying stage can be described by the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There is a unique symmetric equilibrium to the lobbying
stage, with the following holding for each district which has access:
• A district favoring the investment exerts effort e∗i (g, l), with ∂e
∗
i (g, l)/∂l >
0, and obtains an expected payoff of u(g, l) > 0.
• A district which opposes the investment exerts effort e∗i (−b, l) = 0 and
obtains an expected payoff of u(−b, l) ≤ 0.
We give an example which fulfills Assumption 1. Consider a district in-
dexed by i and denote by E =
∑
j 6=i ej the sum of the efforts of the other
districts. Assume that after the competition each district’s chance of attract-
ing the investment is described by the simple ratio contest success function
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ei/(ei + E).
16 In contrast, however, to a standard contest, only the district
which attracts the investment incurs the cost of its effort (or pays the firm
the incentive offered). Under these assumptions district i maximizes
ei
ei + E
(g − ei).
In the unique equilibrium with symmetric pure strategies of the contest game,
a district that favors the investment chooses e∗(g, l) = g(l − 1)/(2l − 1) and
obtains an expected payoff of u(g, l) = g/(2l−1) > 0. A district that opposes
the investment chooses e∗(−b, l) = 0 and receives u(−b, l) = 0.
Assume that the firm grants access in the second stage to all firms voting
for the tariff, because, on the one hand, the firm will not invest in a district
which voted against the tariff and, on the other hand, equilibrium effort
in the third stage increases with the number of active competitors. If all
districts vote against the tariff, then the firm grants access to all districts.
This implies that in the initial voting stage equation (1) becomes
u(pi, l) > 0 if k > 0 and (5)
pi > u(pi, m) if k = 0, (6)
where again k denotes the number of other districts that vote for the tariff.
On the other hand, equations (2) and (3), become
u(pi, l)− C > −C and (7)
u(pi, l)− C > 0. (8)
Notice that for a district that opposes the investment, (pi = −b), it is
now a weakly (rather than strictly) dominant strategy to vote against the
tariff, as a district now has an alternative way of signaling its opposition to
the firm’s investment, namely by setting ei = 0 in the contest stage.
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Again we search for equilibria with symmetric pure strategies. We start
with the voting profile in which all districts which favor the investment vote
16If all districts with access offer no incentives, we assume that all districts have the
same win probability 1/h, where h is the number of districts with access.
17Contrary to the benchmark, when u(−b, l) = 0 it is now an equilibrium for all districts
to vote for the tariff. A district that opposes the investment might vote for the tariff
because it does not compete actively at the lobbying stage and, thus, will not attract the
firm’s investment. Anticipating this, it is indifferent between voting for and against the
tariff.
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for the tariff, and all others use their weakly dominant strategy and vote
against the tariff. Consider a district that favors the investment. By as-
sumption at least (n + 1)/2 other districts vote for the tariff. Thus, no
district’s vote is decisive and the trade-off in equation (7) is relevant. Be-
cause the district gains from access, voting for the tariff is better than voting
against. The firm is strictly worse-off if access is allocated to fewer districts
and would not invest in a district that voted against the tariff. As before the
voting behavior is consistent with the firm’s inference.18
As in the benchmark, it is not an equilibrium for all districts to vote
against the tariff. For if they did and a district changes its vote to support
the tariff, it will be the only district gaining access and is sure to attract the
investment (see equation 6).
5.6 Capital mobility
Central to our analysis is the assumption that a special interest can make a
choice that benefits one district more than another. An obvious such choice is
where to invest. We would then expect a firm to exert more political influence
if capital is mobile than if it is not. We would not expect, for example, a
mining company in Wyoming to threaten to move its mine to Rhode Island.
But whereas capital mobility within a nation can increase a firm’s political
influence, international capital mobility may reduce it. Consider outsourcing
of call centers, and suppose that some districts in the country want to attract
such jobs. If each district believes that the firm will find lower costs in
India than anywhere in the U.S., no U.S. district could attract the jobs
by supporting a policy the call-industry favors. Similarly, increased capital
mobility across member states of the European Union should reduce the
political power of special interests within each state, but increase the power
of special interests when dealing with the European Commission or with the
Council of Ministers.
It turns out that for this reasoning to hold it is crucial that no district can
attract the investment by supporting the tariff. If—returning to the example
18Notice that even if at the last stage competition is very fierce and the firm can ap-
propriate all the rent from matching to a district favoring the investment, that is even if
u(g, l) = 0, it is still an equilibrium for a district that favors the investment to vote for
the tariff. That is, any one district gains nothing from voting against the tariff when a
majority of other districts vote for it, and might as well vote for it.
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of call centers—there is an arbitrarily small probability that the firm invests
in the U.S., our result is robust.
Suppose a firm can invest in either of two countries, indexed by 1, 2. The
countries vote simultaneously on the tariff and then the firm decides where
to invest. The firm prefers to invest in a country that approved the tariff.
So, if one country approves the tariff (denoted by A), while the other rejects
it (denoted by R), investment probabilities p are 1 and 0, respectively. If
both approve or reject the tariff, each has a strictly positive probability of
attracting the firm’s investment. So denoting by di ∈ {A, R} the countries’
decisions, we have
p1 =


pˆA1 ∈ (
1
6
, 5
6
) if d1 = d2 = A
pˆR1 ∈ (
1
6
, 5
6
) if d1 = d2 = R
1 if d1 = A and d2 = R
0 if d1 = R and d2 = A
,
and p2 = 1− p1.
Consider the voting decision of a district in country i. Denoting by kc the
number of other districts that vote for the tariff in country c, (and similarly
the total numbers of districts nc ), equations (1), (2) and (3), become
pi
pi
ki + 1
>
{
0 if ki + kj > 0
pi
ni+nj
if ki + kj = 0
, (9)
pi
pi
ki + 1
− C > −C and (10)
pi
pi
ki + 1
− C > 0. (11)
Notice that when country j rejects the tariff, equations (10) and (11) coincide
with equations (2) and (3). Note also that for a district that views investment
as bad (pi = −b), it is now a weakly dominant strategy to vote against the
tariff.
Again we consider symmetric pure-strategy equilibria and start with the
voting profile in which all districts which favor the investment vote for the
tariff, and all others use their weakly dominant strategy to vote against the
tariff. Consider a district that favors the investment. By assumption, at least
(ni + 1)/2 other districts vote for the tariff. Therefore no district’s vote is
decisive and the trade-off in equation (10) is relevant. Since pi > 0, for each
district which favors the investment, voting for the tariff is strictly better
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than voting against it. As before, this is the unique symmetric equilibrium
and the voting behavior is consistent with the firm’s inference.
Proposition 4 There is a unique pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium.
In this equilibrium each district which favors the investment votes for the
tariff; each other district votes against the tariff. Both countries adopt the
tariff.
Notice lastly that the introduction of capital mobility worsens the out-
come compared to the benchmark. Both countries pass inefficient legislation,
though the firm will invest in only one. Thus, capital mobility within a na-
tion and international capital mobility can increase a firm’s political influence
and the inefficiency of political decisions.
5.7 Retrospective voting
Our approach can also work if voters vote for candidates retrospectively
rather than prospectively. That entails less sophistication or strategic voting
by voters, relying instead on the sophistication of elected officials who seek
reelection.
We modify the previous assumptions by supposing that voters in a district
are more likely to re-elect an incumbent the greater their welfare during his
term before the election. Then in those districts where voters favor the
investment the incumbent can increase his chances of winning re-election by
voting for the tariff, thereby increasing the chances that the firm will invest
in his district.
5.8 Sequential voting
Our argument requires that voting is simultaneous. In this subsection we
show that sequential voting can avoid inefficient collective decisions. We
argue, however, that sequential voting appears rare in practice.
Suppose that districts vote in an exogenously given order. To find a
subgame-perfect equilibrium we solve this game by backward induction.
Consider the district that votes last. Depending on the votes of the
districts that already voted, either equation (1), (2), or (3) captures the
voting situation. Notice that a district which opposes the investment strictly
prefers to vote against the tariff. A district which favors the investment and
is not pivotal votes for the tariff; otherwise it votes against.
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Consider now the penultimate district. Anticipating the choice of the last
voting district, the district votes for the tariff if it both favors the investment
and is not pivotal in the vote; it votes against otherwise. Since this behavior
holds for all districts going backwards through the voting game, we see that
no district which is pivotal votes for the tariff. All districts that favor the
investment vote for the tariff until just one vote is missing to approve the
tariff. All other districts vote against. Observe that when voting is sequen-
tial, at least one district is pivotal during the voting procedure. This never
happens under the simultaneous procedure.
It is also straightforward to see that this equilibrium is unique. We sum-
marize with
Proposition 5 Under sequential voting there exists a unique subgame per-
fect equilibrium, in which the tariff is rejected. In this equilibrium, of the
districts which favor the investment, only the first (n − 1)/2 in the voting
order vote for the tariff; all other districts vote against.
We saw that in our model sequential voting can avoid the inefficient col-
lective decisions. But sequential voting appears rare. Even voting proce-
dures that at first sight appear sequential are effectively simultaneous. For
instance, the U.S. House of Representatives employs several voting proce-
dures. Under the so-called roll-call vote the names of congressmen are called
alphabetically and each announces his voting decision. Since calling over
four-hundred names is very time consuming, this method is rarely used. A
similar method exists in the U.S. Senate. However, in both the House and the
Senate under these procedures a vote can be changed while the vote remains
open, so voting is effectively simultaneous.
6 Conclusion
Standard models of lobbying analyze situations in which special interests
seek favors from voters or their representatives. We presented a theory which
reverses this structure. Voters seek a favor from the special interest and offer
in return support for a policy important to the lobby.
The mechanism we describe has several attractive features. It is consistent
with the observed low level of spending by firms on political influence. Our
mechanism may dominate direct bribery not only because bribery is more
costly and illegal. Indeed, a firm desiring to learn the political preferences
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of a district may not want to bribe the incumbent congressman. For if it
did and he voted for the tariff, the firm would not learn whether the district
favors the industry and the investment.
As discussed above, in contrast to standard theories of influence, our
mechanism is time consistent—legislators may vote for an inefficient policy,
and the firm can indeed have an incentive to invest in a district whose legis-
lator voted for the tariff.
Another attraction of our approach is that, like the menu auction men-
tioned earlier, it can accommodate multi-dimensional policies, for instance,
several tariffs for different industries decided upon at the same time. Though
the cost from a given tariff to a district may be higher when other tariffs are
imposed, our results hold, since they hold for any level of these costs.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the mechanism can apply to policies
other than tariffs or to incentives other than new investment. What is im-
portant is the existence of an outside party rewarding a vote for the policy.
In the introductory example of congressmen seeking to establish a particular
voting record, this outside party is the voters. Another example is a fed-
eral rescue program designed to save a firm threatened by bankruptcy. The
favor that voters seek could then be to avoid closure of branches, that is,
disinvestment rather than investment in the district.
A similar argument can apply to corruption. A corrupt mayor may tell
each voting bloc or district that he will favor it if they vote for him, and
otherwise will not. An equilibrium is for each district to support the incum-
bent, corrupt, mayor. For if any one district voted against the mayor, and
the mayor had to prioritize service, then he may well give the district which
opposed him a lower priority. The district would therefore not have affected
the election, but would have hurt itself.
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